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Abstract
Forest tax programs offer reduced property taxes to private forest owners as incentive to
sustainably manage their forests and to encourage the provision of ecosystem services.
They also protect forests from conversion to other land uses and ensure the viable supply
of timber for forest products industries. Despite the benefits that these programs provide,
they can negatively impact local municipalities by reducing the property tax base, which
can then cause local governments to increase tax rates for non-preferential properties in
order to maintain revenue needed to run their services. This shifts the tax burden from
participating properties to nonparticipating properties. The purpose of this study was to
simulate and analyze the effects that increases in enrollment in the Commercial Forest
and Managed Forest Law programs have on township millage rates in the Upper
Peninsula of Michigan and the northern region of Wisconsin. Tax data were collected
from the year 2018, and a deterministic model with hypothetical future scenarios was run
to estimate the changes in the millage rate with 5%, 10%, and 15% increases in program
enrollment. Such increases in enrollment resulted in the average township needing to
increase the tax rates on non-enrolled properties by between 0.002% to 64.7%, depending
on the magnitude of increased enrollment and pre-enrollment forestland values, to
maintain a constant revenue. In general, the magnitude of the increase was rather
minimal, but there was a range in sensitivity across townships with some experiencing
much higher tax rate increases. Rural townships, with a low population and a smaller tax
base were seen to be most sensitive to changes in program enrollment. Possible policy
changes to the forest tax programs and the states’ reimbursement policies may need to be
considered to help mitigate any loss in tax revenue in the township and to lessen its
sensitivity. However, this study only focuses on one side of the issue. Future research is
needed to study the economic benefits that are received by the townships from enrollment
in these forest tax programs, and to study if the benefits outweigh the costs of the
programs.

vi

1 Introduction
1.1 Overview of Forest Tax Programs
Forest ecosystem services provide many benefits to individuals and societies,
including the provision of timber and wood fiber, protection of water, protection of
wildlife habitat, and recreational opportunities (Kilgore et al. 2018b). An estimated 58%
of forestland in the United States is privately owned, 36% being owned by family forest
owners (Butler et al. 2016a). However, private forests are threatened by poor
management, such as high-grading. In some contexts, the decision to not manage forests
can prove to be harmful as it can perpetuate existing forest health problems rather than
seeking to improve them.
Forests are also threatened by development and parcelization should landowners
feel pressured to sell their land due to the burden of property taxes (Butler et al. 2012,
Kelly et al. 2016). This is because property taxes are paid on an annual basis regardless of
whether or not revenue is generated (Butler et al. 2012). Timberland taxed at high
property tax rates could incentivize overcutting, as landowners seek to generate revenues
to offset such taxes (Sexton, 2003). Such harvesting practices can be detrimental to the
overall health and economic value of the forest, as healthy trees with high economic
value are removed, leaving behind the defective and low-vigor trees, which could lead to
depletion of natural resources if applied repeatedly (Nyland et al. 2016). To help relieve
the tax burden on private forest owners governments have developed forest tax programs,
which serve to provide incentives through preferential tax treatment to qualified forested
lands.
Forest tax programs are administered by state and local governments and were
initially developed to reduce property taxes on private forested property to discourage
land-use conversion and maintain timber production (Fortney and Arano, 2010). They are
also used to encourage the provision of ecosystem services, as well as continuing to
protect forests from conversion to other land uses and to ensure the viable supply of
timber for forest products industries (Kilgore et al. 2018b). Forest ecosystem services that
are a common focus across different programs include the production of timber and fiber
products, protection of soils and wetlands, protection of fish and wildlife habitat, open
1

space and scenic resources, protection of water quality, and recreational opportunities
(Kilgore et al. 2018b). One unexpected benefit of these programs is that they help to
promote forest carbon sequestration, through the conservation and management of large,
forested areas, which may help to aid the country in its ability to meet the climate change
policy obligations. With the current forest tax policies that are in place, it is estimated
that by 2050, about $8 billion per year in climate change mitigation benefits will be
provided (Daigneault et al. 2020).
All fifty states offer a preferential tax program to private landowners (Butler et al.
2012), and currently 44% of all eligible private forestland, which include
corporate/industrial forestland, in the United States are enrolled in property tax programs
(Kilgore et al. 2018b). The programs differ in their goals and qualifications, but the
underlying goal is to promote the sustainability of private forests (Kilgore et al. 2018a).
Whether or not a property is qualified for preferential tax treatment differs for each
program, but in general parcel size and location, type and condition of the forest
resources, and the ability to produce certain goods and services determine whether or not
a parcel qualifies for a given forest tax program (Kilgore et al. 2018a).
There are uncertainties as to the effectiveness of these programs. Kilgore et al.
(2007) found that while program administrators viewed financial incentive programs as
having a positive effect on promoting sustainable practices, family forest owners viewed
technical assistance and information as more important and were not influenced so much
by the incentive programs. Meier et al. (2019) also found that tax programs may not be
effective at encouraging landowners to preserve and retain their land as forest, as
program participants were just as likely as nonparticipants to express intentions to sell
their land at some point. However, there have also been studies which show forest tax
programs effectively conserve forests and reduce property taxes. On average, forest tax
programs reduce forest property taxes by $7.68 per acre across the nation (Kilgore et al.
2018b). However, Frey et al. (2019) found that landowners who enroll in forest tax
programs do so out of concern to conserve their forests, and that this concern was more
influential than to reducing taxes. Forest tax programs have also been shown to be
effective in preventing development on forested land (Locke and Rissman, 2012).
2

Overall, despite the uncertainties as to their effectiveness, forest tax programs are used as
a policy incentive tool to encourage the sustainability of forests. Many forest owners are
interested and desire to know how to manage their forestland sustainably, and these forest
tax programs help enable them to do so (Kilgore et al. 2007).
There are five different types of forest tax programs: ad valorem, current use, flat
rate, exemption, and hybrid programs (Hibbard et al. 2003). Ad valorem programs tax
forestland according to its fair market value. Current use programs tax the land based on
its taxable value according to its current use as forestland. Flat rate programs tax the
property at a fixed rate per acre. Exemption programs completely exempt forestland from
property taxes. Hybrid programs combine the current use and ad valorem methodology to
determine the property tax (Hibbard et al. 2003).

1.2 Public Polices for Private Forests
Forest policies are designed to encourage preservation and sustainable management
of forestlands so that society can continue to receive the benefits that private forests
provide. Forest policies also help to address externalities, positive and negative, and
market failures that arise with the management of private forests (Cubbage et al. 2007).
An externality occurs when the actions of an individual or group either bring about harm
(a negative externality) or provide benefits (a positive externality) to individuals or a
society, but yet do not bear the cost nor are compensated for their actions (Gruber, 2019).
For instance, the management of a nearby forest may negatively impact certain groups of
individuals by reducing aesthetic value, however those individuals may not be
compensated for their loss. Poor forestry practices may also result in erosion and
pollution into a nearby stream, which impact fish populations and would thus negatively
affect fishers. However, the forest owner may not necessarily bear the cost of the loss
experienced by the fishers, thus resulting in a negative externality. Private forest
landowners also may not be compensated for the positive externalities that their forests
provide to the public, such as providing wildlife habitat, protecting water quality, and
providing aesthetic beauty.
3

Forest policies are meant to address these issues by providing regulations or
incentives to ensure the sustainable management of forests, to reduce erosion and
pollution, and to help compensate the landowners, such as by reducing taxes, for the
benefits that their forests provide to the general public (Cubbage et al. 2007). Figure 1,
taken from Aguilar et al. (2019), illustrates how forest policies help to account for the
loss in social efficiency caused by externalities.
Externalities can shift the demand or supply curve, thereby causing the two curves
to intersect at a different point, away from the market equilibrium. Forest policies help to
correct for this by inducing a cost or an incentive to shift the supply curve so as to return
to the point of equilibrium and social efficiency. For instance, the demand curve may
shift upwards from curve D to D’ as forest value increases, but this causes a decrease in
social efficiency as the supply curve, or the cost to the forest owners, remains the same.
Forest tax programs help to restore social efficiency by offering a tax incentive to the
forest owners, thereby reducing the cost of forests which causes the supply curve to shift
downwards from curve S to S’ (Fig. 1).
There are three main categories of policy instruments that can be used to encourage
the participation of private forest landowners: financial, regulative, and informational
(Serbruyns and Luyssaert, 2006). Financial policy tools include payments for certain
management activities, such as planting trees or improving timber stands, and incentives
to encourage conservation, such as tax reductions (Cubbage et al. 2009). Regulatory
policy tools are used to regulate the management strategies of forests to ensure
sustainable management, and are used to prevent undesirable or destructive outcomes,
such as pollution, excess timber harvests, and resource exhaustion. They are also used to
prevent negative externalities and market failures, as well as to ensure forest regeneration
and to promote positive externalities, (Cubbage et al. 2009). Informational policy tools
deals with the education of both the public and the professionals. These tools can be used
to educate the public on how to properly manage and preserve their natural resources, and
to educate and improve the technical skills of forestry and logging professionals
(Cubbage et al. 2007). Informational tools may also be used to inform private forest
owners about different incentive programs that they can enroll their properties in for the
4

purpose of managing and conserving their forests. Compared to the other policy tools,
informational tools may be the most important as their implementation and success
affects the success of financial and regulative tools. In a study done in Belgium, the more
highly educated landowners in matters of forest management were more likely to accept
policy instruments than owners who had a poor education and understanding (Serbruyns
and Luyssaert, 2006). Figure 2 illustrates how these policy tools help to exchange forest
values between the private landowners and society, as well as between the current and the
future generations through the means of conserving the forests (Aguilar et al. 2019).

S

Value (costs, benefits)
benefits)

Supply curves: Downward shift in value to
producers (forest owners) denoting lower
S’ costs

D’
D
Forest resources

Demand curves: Upward shift in value
to consumers (society) as forests grow
in value

Figure 1. Process of value co-creation within a neo-classical supply-and-demand partial market
equilibrium framework. A change in welfare (wellbeing) among groups can be positive (shaded
area) as the marginal value (costs or benefits) to each group shift. Solid lines denote value
relationships prior to changes (S, D), and dotted lines denote posterior value relationships (S’,
D’). Public policy can be instrumental to such changes. (Aguilar et al. 2019)
Reprinted/adapted by permission from Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH:
Springer Nature, Total economic value, ecosystem services and the role of public policy
instruments in the creation and destruction of forest values by F.X. Aguilar, M.C. Kelly, and B.
Danley. In: Services in Family Forestry by T. Hujala, A. Toppinen,, and B. Butler.
[COPYRIGHT] (2019).
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Future generations

Current generations
Landowners

Policy

Policy

Policy

Forests

Landowners

SOCIETY

SOCIETY

Figure 2. Forest value exchange model to account for temporal changes of value in no-use
exchanged between current and future beneficiaries. (Aguilar et al. 2019)
Reprinted/adapted by permission from Springer Nature Customer Service Center GmbH:
Springer Nature, Total economic value, ecosystem services and the role of public policy
instruments in the creation and destruction of forest values by F.X. Aguilar, M.C. Kelly, and B.
Danley. In: Services in Family Forestry by T. Hujala, A. Toppinen,, and B. Butler.
[COPYRIGHT] (2019).

1.3 Overview of Property Taxes
Property taxes are a significant source of revenue for local governments,
accounting for three-quarters of the total tax revenue (Ganz, 2014). Local governments
depend upon tax revenue to fund public services, including education, transportation,
emergency response, parks and recreation, and libraries (Seabury, 2020). The extent to
which a local government relies upon property tax revenue depends on three different
factors: the total budget of the municipality, the amount of revenue received from federal
and state governments, and the amount of revenue that is raised from other tax sources
(Brighton, 1993).
Property tax is an ad valorem tax, meaning that it is based on an assessed value
(Sexton, 2014). An assessed value is a percentage of the fair market value, which is the
6

price that the property would sell for in an open market. For instance, in Michigan the
property is assessed at 50% of the market value (Sexton, 2003). There are two different
types of property that may be included in the tax base: real and personal property. Real
property is defined as land and anything that is permanently attached to it. Personal
property is the property that is not part of or permanently attached to real property
(Sexton, 2003). Some states include only real property in their tax base, and others offer
exemptions and differential treatments for certain types of properties (Sexton, 2003).
Some states have classification systems, where different types of property may be taxed
at a different rate or assessed differently, and some properties may be all together exempt
from property taxes, such as properties owned by schools (Sexton, 2003).
The property tax that a landowner will pay is determined from the taxable value of
the property and the millage rate. Some local governments may use the assessed value as
the taxable value, but most often the taxable value is lower than the assessed value. This
is because the value includes any exemptions that the property may be qualified for, and
oftentimes it is capped so as not to exceed a certain amount (Richard, n.d.). The taxable
value is then multiplied by the millage rate to determine the tax levy, which is the actual
amount the landowner will pay. The millage, or mill, rate is the amount of tax payable
per dollar of the assessed (or taxable) value. The mill is a figure that represents 1/10 th of a
cent. Thus, for $1,000 of taxable property value the mill rate would equal $1 (Kagan,
2020). The millage rate is determined by the group (county, township, school, etc.) that is
charging the tax, and each legal entity may set a different millage rate (Kagan, 2020).
Property taxes are a main source of revenue for local governments, and yet there
are many properties, particularly state and federal lands, that are exempt from paying
property taxes. To help offset these losses in property tax revenue, the federal and state
governments make a payment in lieu of taxes (PILT) to the local governments. The
payment is based on the acreage of land owned by the state and federal governments, and
for federal land it is also determined by the population and revenue-sharing payments
received from the state within the county (U.S. Department of Interior, n.d.). Revenuesharing is another additional source of revenue to local governments and is a program
where the state shares revenue with the local governments. For example, in Michigan the
7

state takes 4% of the state’s sale tax revenue, and then distributes 15% of that portion of
the revenue to all cities, villages, and townships (Michigan Department of Treasury, n.d.).

1.4 Tax Incidence
Tax incidence refers to who bears the true burden of the tax (Gruber, 2019).
Regarding the tax of real property, it is considered that the landowner bears the entire
burden of the tax because land is inelastically supplied (Sexton, 2014). To be inelastic
means that the good has few or no substitutes. Since the consumer cannot substitute for
another good there is little change in quantity demanded with changes in price because
the consumer cannot leave the market, causing them to bear the full tax burden (Gruber,
2019).
A redistribution of the tax burden can occur when the tax base is reduced by the
removal of certain properties, as the tax dollars that would have been due from those
properties must now come from other properties that are still part of the tax base
(Chamberlin, 1993). Such a tax shift may be caused by tax incentive programs that seek
to give tax relief to certain types of properties. Such programs include classification
systems, differential assessment programs, forest tax programs, and conservation
easements (Chamberlin, 1993; King and Anderson, 2004; Sexton, 2014). With a
reduction in the tax base, local governments may experience a loss in tax revenue. This
loss may cause the local governments to increase the tax rates (mill rates) for the nonpreferential properties in order to maintain the necessary revenue needed to run their
services (Brighton, 1993; King and Anderson, 2004; Sexton, 2014). Some states
reimburse local governments to help compensate for this loss in tax revenue. In this
situation the tax incidence may change so that the burden of the tax shift may now be
partially borne by the state, and thereby all taxpayers throughout the state and not fully by
the taxpayers within the local municipality. The amount of revenue that is received from
federal or state governments helps determine the extent of the tax burden that is borne by
the property owners. For example, the State of Vermont fully reimburses the towns for
the loss in property taxes due to enrollment in their forest tax programs, thus the state
8

bears the full burden as the tax is now shifted to the state’s general fund rather than to the
landowners of the non-participating properties (Brighton, 1993). In Maine the state only
reimburses the municipality 90% of its tax losses from forest tax programs, thus causing
the remaining 10% of the tax burden to be borne by the municipal taxpayers (Brighton,
1993). Michigan and Wisconsin reimburse the local municipalities at a fixed rate. For
enrollment in the Commercial Forest program, Michigan reimburses at the same tax rate
that is levied on the enrolled properties, which is currently $1.30 per acre (Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Act, 2018), and Wisconsin reimburses for
enrollment in the Managed Forest Law program at $0.20 per acre (Managed Forest Law,
2021).
The tax shift may seem unfair, but it is important to note that such an event is not
uncommon. Whenever governments offer deductions for different types of taxes a tax
shift will occur from the class of taxpayers that are receiving the benefits to the taxpayers
who are not receiving the benefits (Chamberlin, 1993). Also, while these tax shifts may
be deemed a cost to other property owners, they also help protect private forests and
maintain a flow of benefits to local communities, including timber production, public
access, and the conservation of forest lands (Chamberlin, 1993).
More research is needed to determine how significantly forest tax programs impact
local communities in terms of shifting the tax burden, and to discover if the benefits
provided by private forests enrolled in such tax program (e.g. provision of ecosystem
services, timber, and recreational opportunities) outweigh the potential costs of these
programs in terms of increased taxes on non-enrolled properties. If the programs are
indeed causing a reduction in the local government tax revenue through the reduction in
the tax base, then it may be that the policy of these programs should be revisited so as to
continue to provide the benefits that they offer without causing significant harm to the
municipalities. The following literature review provides a background on family forest
owner participation in forest tax programs, as well as a review of previous studies which
have looked at the impacts of enrollment in these preferential tax programs on the local
municipality’s property taxes, specifically for current use-value assessment programs on
agricultural land, conservation easements, and lastly on forest tax programs.
9

1.5 Literature Review
1.5.1

Landowner Participation in Tax Programs
Nationwide, about 44% of all eligible private forestland, which includes land

owned by individuals, families, corporate organizations, Native American tribes,
nongovernmental conservation organizations, and other private entities, is enrolled in a
special property tax program (Kilgore et al. 2018b). While nearly half of all private
forestland is enrolled, participation of family forest owners accounts for a smaller
portion. Only about 17% of family forest ownerships, which accounts for 26% of family
forest land, is enrolled nationwide (Butler et al. 2020). One possible reason for low
participation of these family forest owners is a lack of awareness about such programs as
well as landowner frustrations with the administration and requirements of the programs
(Butler et al. 2012). The programs are seen as difficult to access, unpredictable in regard
to the funding and requirements, and rigid in their management guidelines, sometimes
compelling landowners to manage their land in a way that might not align with their
objectives (Kilgore et al. 2007; Butler et al. 2012). However, despite these complaints the
landowners who do participate have reported overall satisfaction with the programs, and
the programs are generally successful in promoting sustainable management practices
(Butler et al. 2012; Kilgore et al. 2007).
Different studies have looked at the differences between landowners who do
participate in forest tax programs and those who do not to determine the factors that make
a landowner more likely to participate in such programs. In general, landowners that
participate in property tax programs tend to have a higher acreage of land and higher
levels of education and income compared to those who do not participate (Frey et al.
2019; Meier et al. 2019). Participants are also more likely to own their land for timber
and aesthetic reasons, whereas non-participants are more likely to own their land for
hunting purposes (Meier et al. 2019). One interesting aspect is that while these programs
are designed to offer reduced property taxes to act as an incentive for landowners to
enroll, taxes do not seem to be a major factor affecting program enrollment of
landowners. Many private forest owners are indeed concerned about property taxes, and
10

studies have shown that tax uncertainty negatively affects the management decisions of
landowners (Butler et al. 2012; Greene et al. 2014), but landowners are more likely to
enroll out of concern to protect and conserve forested land, rather than to just simply save
money (Frey et al. 2019).
1.5.2

Current use-value assessment programs
The current use-value assessment program taxes qualifying properties according

to the property’s current use rather than by its highest and best use. Coogan et al. (2014)
studied the current use-value assessment program for agricultural lands in Wayne
County, Ohio. They found that enrollment in the program reduced the taxable property
tax base by 69.7%, which would have consequently resulted in the property tax revenues
being reduced by 69.8% if the tax rate was not increased. The authors of that study found
that a larger portion of the property tax burden fell on residential and commercial
property owners, resulting in a shift in the tax burden. A tax shift was also observed by
Dunford and Marousek (1981) who conducted a study on the effects of the use-value
assessment program for farmland in Spokane County, Washington. They found that
enrollment in the program caused an increase in taxes for the nonparticipating properties,
but interestingly the rate of increase was not uniform across the different areas of study,
ranging from a tax increase of 1.1% to 21.9%. They found that the size of the remaining
tax base greatly impacted how much of a tax increase those nonparticipating properties
were likely to receive. Areas which had a large portion of land enrolled in the use-value
assessment program had a smaller tax base, which led to those properties experiencing
the largest tax increases. The areas with a smaller portion of land enrolled in the program
had larger tax base, which led to those areas experiencing much smaller tax increases.
1.5.3

Conservation easements
Another type of tax incentive program for private landowners are conservation

easements. Conservation easements are used to preserve both agricultural and forest land.
With a conservation easement, landowners receive a tax reduction in exchange for
11

transferring their development rights to another entity, usually a nonprofit organization
(King and Anderson, 2004). While conservation easements have also been found to cause
shifts in the tax burden, leading to increases in taxes on nonparticipating properties,
Schuster et al. (2018) believes that this mechanism of the tax shift is an efficient means
for governments to meet conservation targets without having to reduce tax revenues.
Based on their study, conservation targets of increasing protected lands by 17% or 30%
in Canada could be feasibly met. The scenario showing a 9% to 17% increase in area
protection to meet Convention on Biological Diversity targets with the lowest enrollment
uptake of 25% resulted in nonparticipating property tax rates increasing by 0.51%. More
proactive targets to conserve a higher percentage of the landscape, such as increasing
protected lands by 30%, require larger increases in tax rates, but appears feasible
(Schuster et al. 2018).
While these programs tend to cause tax increases on nonparticipating properties in
the short-term, a study by King and Anderson (2004) found that in the long-term, these
programs may cause tax rates to decrease due to an increase in property value of
properties surrounding the protected areas. King and Anderson (2004) analyzed the
effects that conservation easements have on the tax rates for towns in Vermont over the
span of ten years. While tax rates did increase on non-participating properties within the
first few years, the rates were seen to diminish afterwards. This was due to the
surrounding properties around the conserved areas experiencing an increase in their
appraisal value. While this led to higher tax bills for those surrounding properties, it
allowed for the towns to reduce the tax rate overall as the tax levy had increased. This
enabled residents whose lands were relatively far away from the easements to receive
lower tax bills (King and Anderson, 2004). Even though a shift was still seen to occur on
non-enrolled properties, it was shift in the assessed value rather than in the tax rate.
1.5.4

Forest tax programs
Brighton (1993) conducted a study on the current use-value assessment programs

for forestland in the four northern forest states of Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire and
New York. The shifting of the tax burden also occurred in areas with land enrolled in the
12

program, but payments coming from the state were found to be a large factor in
determining the weight of the shift. In all four of these states the state reimburses the
local municipalities for any losses in their tax revenues from the current use-value
assessment programs, but the percentage of the loss that is reimbursed affects the weight
of the tax burden borne by the non-enrolled properties. In the State of Vermont, the towns
are fully reimbursed for their tax revenue losses. This causes the tax burden to be shifted
to the state’s general fund rather than to the taxpayers of the nonparticipating properties
in that local municipality, which consequently results in a shift from the property tax to
other taxes, like the income tax. The states of Maine, New Hampshire, and New York
only partially reimburse towns for the revenue losses, which means that the tax burden is
partially shifted onto the state, and therefore onto taxpayers across the entire state and not
just within the particular municipality, and partially onto the taxpayers within the
municipality, depending on how much of the full amount the municipalities receive.
Brighton (1993) also found that the remaining tax base largely determines how high of a
tax rate increase the municipalities experience. Rural towns with a smaller tax base
experience a larger increase in their tax bill compared to towns with larger tax bases. It is
also important to note that while in the short term these programs can cause a tax shift
and a cost onto society, in the long term they provide benefits to society as they
encourage the preservation of forestland and discourage development (Brighton, 1993).
A study by Rickenbach and Saunders (2009) focused on the tax implications of a
forest tax programs on townships in Wisconsin and found that increases in program
enrollment resulted in the average township experiencing an increased tax rate. However,
similar to the results found by Dunford and Marousek (1981), they noticed that the
relationship varied across townships. While most of the townships experienced only
slight changes to their tax rates, some experienced much larger increases or even
decreases in their tax rates with increases in program enrollment. This suggests that the
townships have different sensitivity levels, with some being more sensitive than others to
changes in program enrollment. One possible reason for this difference is the portion of
land in a township that is enrolled in other tax incentive programs. Rickenbach and
Saunders (2009) noted that the more highly sensitive townships had a greater portion of
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land enrolled in the Agricultural Forest classification, which is a program that also
reduces property taxes for qualifying properties. In situations like this, a township’s
property tax base is already lowered because of land enrolled in competing programs,
which would make the township more sensitive with even further reductions in the tax
base from increasing enrollment in the forest tax program. Rickenbach and Saunders
(2009) also found that a township’s tax base was related to its sensitivity, as the more
highly sensitive townships had a smaller tax base. Additional sources of revenue from the
State also affected the township’s sensitivity to changes in the forest tax program
enrollment, as the more highly sensitive townships received the lower amounts of shared
revenue payments, and the townships with typical enrollment and sensitivity received the
higher amounts of shared revenue payments. Historically in Wisconsin, shared revenue
payments adequately covered any losses experienced in tax revenues, but at the time
when the study was conducted those payments had been frozen at 2003 levels, which
meant that the payments were no longer being adjusted for any changes in land use
classifications in the townships. Seeing as how the more highly sensitive townships
received the lowest amount of shared revenue payments, it shows that indeed these
payments are not being adjusted for changes in land use. This demonstrates the
importance that such revenues have in helping to mitigate any losses in a township’s tax
revenue, due to reductions in the tax base from property tax incentive programs.
Previous literature shows that enrollment in preferential tax programs can indeed
cause a reduction in the local municipality’s property tax base, and may consequently
cause property taxes to increase for the non-enrolled properties. However, there have
been relatively few studies that have looked at how significantly enrollment in these
programs impacts the millage rates issued on non-participating properties, and there have
been no studies that have looked at the tax implications of forest tax programs in
Michigan. My study will contribute to this topic of research by studying how enrollment
in the Commercial Forest program in Michigan (https://www.michigan.gov/dnr/0,4570,7350-79136_79237_80945_83262---,00.html) and the Managed Forest Law program in
Wisconsin (https://dnr.wisconsin.gov/topic/forestlandowners/mfl) impacts the property
tax rates of rural townships, and how significantly they shift the tax burden onto all
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classes of non-participating properties. My research will shed more light on the potential
costs of forest tax programs to non-enrolled property owners, which is important for
economic and social sustainability. It will also further explore possible variables that
could be affecting the townships’ sensitivity levels to changes in the property tax rates
with increasing enrollment in these programs.

1.6 Study Area
The two study areas are Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and northern Wisconsin.
These areas were chosen as they are rural and heavily forested, and include a mix of
ownership types including private, state, and federal lands (Fig. 3).
1.6.1

Upper Peninsula of Michigan
Michigan’s forests have been shaped and influenced over time by both natural and

human factors. Glaciation during the last ice age created a landscape with a wide
variability in topography and soil types, which formed the foundation for the different
forest types (Hamel et al. 2013). Prior to European settlement, the Upper Peninsula was
dominated by late successional lowland and upland conifer forest types. Other common
forest types included hemlock/sugar maple, sugar maple/yellow birch/fir, and
beech/sugar maple (Hamel et al. 2013; Matson et al. 2013). In the mid-late 1800s the
forests of Michigan were heavily logged, which lead to a period of severe wildfires
(Hamel et al. 2013). It was after this time, in the early 1900s, when the public began to
realize the importance of conserving Michigan’s natural resources (Matson et al. 2013).
By the 1990s forestry companies had begun practicing sustainable forestry practices
(Hamel et al. 2013), which have continued to be the primary focus of forest management
today. Currently the dominate forest types are now early successional species, such as
aspen, and other deciduous species (Hamel et al. 2013; Matson et al. 2013). The dominate
forest type in Michigan is maple/beech/birch, with 44% of it located in the western region
of the Upper Peninsula. For softwoods species, spruce/fir is the most dominant forest
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type group in Michigan, with 47% of it being found in the eastern region of the Upper
Peninsula (Pugh, 2018).
The State of Michigan has over 20 million acres of forest land, of which the
Upper Peninsula contains 45% (Pugh, 2018). Statewide, about 65% of Michigan’s forests
are privately owned, 47.3% owned by family forest owners, 14.6% owned by private
corporations, and 3.6% owned by other private entities (Pugh, 2018). The remaining 38%
of forested land is publicly owned, 20.8% owned by the State of Michigan, 13.6% owned
by the USDA Forest Service, 1.1% owned by the National Park Service, and 2.6% owned
by other public groups (Pugh, 2018). Timberland, which is forested land that grows
suitable trees or is managed for timber, accounts for 95% of the forested land (Pugh,
2018).
Michigan’s forests play a significant role in the state’s economy. The forest
products industries contribute $20.3 billion in output, $5.2 billion in labor, and provides
96,623 jobs, taking into account all the direct, indirect, and induced effects of the
industries (Leefers, 2016). In the Upper Peninsula where most of the land area is forested,
these forest products industries act as an even greater contributor to Michigan’s economy.
Over a third of the manufacturing jobs in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula are in the forest
products industries, the most significant industries being the primary paper and
paperboard production industry, logging, and the primary solid wood products and woodbased power industry (Leefers, 2016). Overall the forest products industries contribute
$1.8 billion in output, $3.1 million in labor, and 4,966 jobs in the Upper Peninsula’s
western region, and $3.8 million in output, $61.9 million in labor, and 1,073 jobs in the
eastern region (Leefers, 2016). Michigan’s forests also serve as a major attraction for
tourists, and thus affects other industries related to tourism.
There are 15 counties and 149 townships in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula.
According to the regions specified by Michigan’s Department of Natural Resources, the
western region contains 10 of the counties and 102 townships. The eastern region
contains the remaining 5 counties and 47 townships (Leefers, 2016). The population in
the western region is 172,828, and the eastern region having a population of 132,417.
Combined, the population of the Upper Peninsula makes up only 3% of the total
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population of the State of Michigan (9,995,915) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018b). The Upper
Peninsula is rural with a lower average household income compared to the State of
Michigan overall. The mean income in the Upper Peninsula is $57,000, while the mean
income for Michigan is $77,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a). Michigan itself also only
contains 3% of the nation’s population, the entire United States having a population of
327,167,439 and a mean income of $87,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018).
1.6.2

Northern Wisconsin
Glacial activity from the last glaciation period shaped and formed the landscape

of Wisconsin to its present state, creating thousands of kettle lakes and allowing for a
complex array of different habitat types. In the 1800s, during the European settlement,
forestland made up 63-86% of the state. The northern region was dominated by pine,
spruce, tamarack, sugar maple, hemlock, and yellow birch. The central and northwestern
region of Wisconsin consists of sandier soil, making pine forests and barrens more
abundant. The southern region was dominated by oak-hickory and maple-basswood
forest types. Oak savannahs and prairies were prevalent in parts of the southern and
western regions (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018).
The great “cutover” began in the late 1800s and lasted into the early 1900s in
which the whole state saw a great deal of its timber harvested. This was followed by
severe and devasting fires, due to the large amounts of slash left behind from the timber
harvests. By the 1930s most of the valuable timber in the northern region had been
removed or lost by fires. This allowed for early successional species, such as aspen and
birch, to become more prevalent (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018).
Currently Wisconsin has over 16.4 million acres of timberland, with most of the
forests being located in the northern regions (Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources, 2020a). The dominant forest types in northern Wisconsin are aspen/birch,
maple/basswood, spruce/fir, pine, and oak/pine forest groups, and the dominate forest
type in southern Wisconsin is the oak/hickory group (Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources, 2020a). Most of the forested land in Wisconsin is privately owned, with 57%
owned by individual family landowners and 13% being owned by other private owners.
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The remaining 30% is public land, with 14% owned by counties and municipalities, 9%
by the federal government, and 7% by the state (Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources, 2018). The number of private forest owners continues to increase, the number
of non-industrial private forest owners increasing by 12.4% from 2006-2013. This
increase in ownership has also consequently led to an increase in parcelization as more
land parcels are needing to be divided, with an average increase of 6,400 new parcels per
year (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018).
The forest products industry is an important contributor to Wisconsin’s economy.
About 65,000 people are directly employed by the forest products industry, and more
than 110,000 people are indirectly employed. Companies produce about 25 billion dollars
of forest products every year (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2018). Of all
the forest products industries, the paper industry is the most significant contributor to the
economy, holding nearly half of the jobs in the forest products industry (Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources, 2020b). Besides this direct contribution to the
economy, the forests of Wisconsin also offer many recreational opportunities, which help
contribute to industries related to tourism.
The northern highland region of Wisconsin consists of 24 counties, but this study
will only focus on 10 of those counties: Ashland, Florence, Forest, Iron, Langlade,
Lincoln, Marinette, Oneida, Price, and Sawyer counties. Within these 10 counties there
are 149 townships. The population of these counties is about 187,563, and the average
household income is $61,000. These northern counties hold 3% of the state’s population,
with the State of Wisconsin having a population of 5,183,658 with an average income of
$79,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018).
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Figure 3: Map of study areas with forest ownership types

1.7 Forest Tax Programs in Study
1.7.1

Commercial Forest Program
Michigan’s Commercial Forest (CF) program is a property tax incentive program

designed to encourage private forest landowners to conserve large tracts of forested land
while managing for long-term timber production. It is a voluntary program which is open
to all private forest landowners, including family forest owners and commercial forest
owners, and is administered by Michigan’s Department of Natural Resources.
Participating landowners pay reduced property taxes at a fixed tax rate rather than paying
the ad valorem general property tax. From 2017-2021 the tax rate is fixed at a $1.30 per
acre, which is set to increase by 5 cents every 5 years. Eligible properties must be at least
40 acres and be capable of producing a commercial stand of timber and tree species with
economic value. Enrolled landowners are required to actively manage their forest
according to a qualified management plan. Enrolled land can only be used for producing
and harvesting timber. It cannot be used for agriculture, grazing, mineral extraction, or
development. It is also required that enrolled land be open to the public for hunting,
trapping, and fishing. Once enrolled, properties are classified as Commercial Forest into
perpetuity, as long as they continue to meet the requirements. Participating landowners
can withdraw their property from the program, but they are subject to a withdrawal
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penalty whose amount depends on several factors, including how many years the
landowner was in the program and how many acres they are withdrawing (Michigan
Department of Natural Resources, 2018). If the enrolled property undergoes a transfer in
ownership, its status as Commercial Forest land is not affected. The new owner may
either choose to continue or withdraw from the program. If they withdraw, they are
responsible for the withdrawal fee. This program is not contractual for the landowners.
The legislature may change the rules at any given time, and the landowners are expected
to just absorb the changes. Currently over 2.2 million acres of forested land in the Upper
Peninsula is enrolled in the Commercial Forest program (Michigan Department of
Natural Resources, 2020).
1.7.2

Managed Forest Law
Wisconsin’s Managed Forest Law (MFL) is available to all private forest owners,

including family forest owners and commercial forest owners, and is administered by the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. It is a tax incentive program designed to
encourage private landowners to manage their forests sustainably. Eligible parcels must
be at least 20 acres, have at least 80% forest coverage, and be capable of growing timber
for wood products. It is required that participating landowners have management plans
and conduct timber harvests. The landowners must commit to a 25- or 50-year
sustainable forest management plan. The landowner can opt to open their land to the
public, or to keep it closed. Open land may be used by the public for recreational
activities, including hunting, fishing, and hiking. Participating landowners pay an acreage
share tax rather than the ad valorem property tax. For open land the acreage share tax rate
is based on 5% of the average statewide tax on productive forest land ($40.80 per acre),
which amounts to $2.04 per acre. For closed land the landowners pay the acreage share
tax rate plus an additional closed acreage fee which is based on 20% of the average
statewide tax, which amounts to a tax rate of $10.20 for closed land. These tax rates are
applicable for 2018-2022 and are set to adjust every 5 years to reflect the changing
property tax rates. These rates apply for properties that are enrolled in the MFL program
after 2005. Lands that were enrolled before 2005, from 1987-2004, pay much lower tax
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rates: $0.74 for open land and $1.75 for closed land. Enrolled properties can be
withdrawn from the program, but they are subject to a withdrawal tax plus a withdrawal
fee of $300 (Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2017). Enrolled properties that
undergo a transfer in ownership are still enrolled in the MFL program if the new owner
agrees to conform to the program rules. If they choose to withdraw from the program,
they are responsible for the withdrawal fees. This program is contractual, and once the
property is in the program the state cannot change the rules. Currently over 3.4 million
acres of forested land in Wisconsin is enrolled in the Managed Forest Law program
(Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2020c).

Table 1: Commercial Forest vs Managed Forest Law
Commercial Forest
Managed Forest Law
State
Min. Acreage Requirement
Open to Public
Management Plan
Withdrawal penalty
Tax rate

Michigan
40
Yes
Required
Yes
$1.30/acre

Wisconsin
20
Optional
Required
Yes
Open land: $2.04/acre
Closed land: $10.20/acre

1.8 Research Questions
In view of the findings of the previous literature regarding property enrollment in
preferential tax programs and their effects on the township’s property tax base and
millage rates, this research addresses the following questions with regards to the
Commercial Forest (CF) program in Michigan and the Managed Forest Law (MFL)
program in Wisconsin:
1. How does increased enrollment in CF and MFL affect tax rates on all classes of
non-enrolled properties included in the townships tax base?
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2. Are some townships more sensitive to changes in their millage rate with changes
in property enrollment than others, and if so why?
3. To what degree do the PILT and other government reimbursement payments help
to mitigate the shift to non-enrolled properties?
4. For WI, is the sensitivity to changes in the millage rate different depending on
whether increasing MFL enrollment occurs in the “open” or “closed” category?
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2 Methods
2.1 Data Collection
Data were collected only for the Commercial Forest program in Michigan and the
Managed Forest Law program in Wisconsin. The Qualified Forest program in Michigan
was not included in the study as the data related to that program are available only at the
county level, and this study investigated effects at the township level. Also, unlike the CF
program which simply applies a fixed rate to all properties, the tax fee that is due on
Qualified Forest properties depends on that property’s taxable value, as one of the main
tax benefits is a local school operation tax exemption of up to 18 mills. However,
individual parcel data is not readily available for the State of Michigan. Due to these
complications, township level enrollment and tax revenue data for the Qualified Forest
program was not considered in this study.
Census data regarding township demographics and housing characteristics were
collected from the United States Census Bureau. Data were collected at the township
level for the year 2018, and included population, median household income, median
house value, the proportion of housing units that were owner-occupied, renter-occupied,
and vacant, and the year that the house owner moved into unit, which was measured
according to the number of owner-occupied housing units that were moved into. The
variable used shows the proportion of owner-occupied housing units that were moved
into before and after 2010. The township’s population was divided by the township’s
total area to get the population density per square mile. The population data does not
include seasonal or absentee owners. These data were collected to get an estimate of the
number of non-enrolled properties and how valuable they are, which gives an indication
of the size of the township’s available property tax base.
Property tax data were collected from year 2018 at the township level from various
online sources (See Table 2). This particular year was chosen as it was the most recent
tax year with available data at the time when this study was initiated. The total acres
enrolled in the forest tax programs and the tax rates levied on those enrolled properties
were extracted from the respective States’ Department of Natural Resources websites
(https://www.michigan.gov/dnr; https://dnr.wisconsin.gov/). The total taxable value of
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real property in each of the Michigan townships was extracted from the State’s
Department of Treasury (https://www.michigan.gov/treasury). For Wisconsin, the
township’s total assessed value for the combined property classes of 5 (undeveloped), 5m
(agricultural forest), 6 (forest), and 7 (other) was extracted from the State’s Department
of Revenue (https://www.revenue.wi.gov/pages/home.aspx). The total assessed value was
used rather than the taxable value (the DOR Base Value) as the assessed values are used
to determine how the tax burden is distributed among the properties (Wisconsin
Department of Revenue, 2020). The combined township and school millage rates for the
townships in Michigan were extracted from the Ad Valorem Property Tax Report from
the State of Michigan’s website (State of Michigan, n.d.). The millage rates for
Wisconsin were extracted from the Town, Village, and City dashboard on the Department
of Revenue website (https://www.revenue.wi.gov/Pages/RA/TVC-Taxes.aspx). The net
rate was used as it included the school levy credit. The millage rates were then divided by
1,000 to represent the amount of tax payable per $1,000 taxable value.
Additional sources of revenue for the townships include revenue sharing payments
from the state, and Payment-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILT) from lands owned by the federal and
state governments. Revenue sharing payments from Michigan were collected from the
State of Michigan’s Department of Treasury website where the summed total of the
constitutional, city, village, and township revenue sharing (CVTRS) statutory, and
supplemental CVTRS statutory were included. The revenue sharing payments from
Wisconsin were collected from the Wisconsin Department of Revenue website, where the
sum of the payments from the county and municipal aid, utility aid, and the expenditure
restraint programs were included. PILT payments from federal lands in Michigan were
collected from the U.S. Department of Interior website (https://www.doi.gov/), and PILT
payments from state lands were collected from Michigan’s Department of Natural
Resources website. Since these payments are reported at the county level a PILT rate was
calculated by dividing the total payment made to the county by the total acres in each
county. This rate was then applied to the federal/state acreage in each of the townships
within that county. PILT payments from federal and state lands in Wisconsin were
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collected from the state’s Department of Natural Resources (B. Daul 2020, personal
communication, 6 October), and these reports were given at the township level.

Table 2: Sources of Data Collected for Michigan and Wisconsin townships
State
Type of Data
Source
Both
Census
United States Census Bureau
Michigan Department of Natural Resources –
CF Program
Tax Year 2018 Commercial Forest Reports by
Enrollment
County
State of Michigan Department of Treasury –
Total Taxable Value State Tax Commission 2018 Taxable Valuation
Report
State of Michigan –
Millage rates
2018 Ad Valorem Property Tax Report
Michigan
State of Michigan Department of Treasury –
Revenue Sharing
Constitutional and CVTRS Revenue Sharing
Projections FY2018 and FY2019 Actuals
PILT from Federal
U.S. Department of Interior –
Lands
Payments and Acreage by State/County 2018
Michigan Department of Natural Resources –
PILT from State
Payment in Lieu of Taxes Report Taxation Year
Lands
2018
MFL Program
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources –
Enrollment
2018 Acreage Summary Report by Municipality
Total Assessed
Wisconsin Department of Revenue –
Values
Preliminary Major Class Comparison Report
Wisconsin Department of Revenue –
Millage Rates
The Town, Village, and City Dashboard
Wisconsin Department of Revenue –
Revenue Sharing
2019 Estimated Shared Revenue and
Expenditure Restraint Payments
Wisconsin
PILT from Federal
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources –
Lands
FFY2018 USFS PILT
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources –
Payment of State Aid to Municipalities as
Provided by Section 70.114 of the Statutes for
PILT from State
the Payment Year 2019
Lands
Payment of 88 cents per acre to Towns for the
Year 2019 as Provided by Section 70.113 of the
Statutes
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2.2 Spreadsheet Model
A deterministic model was used to simulate the effects of increased acres enrolled
in the forest tax programs on townships millage rates, assuming that township property
tax revenues need to remain constant. The calculation used for estimating the total
property tax revenues received by each township is as follows:
𝑅 = (𝑇𝑇𝑉 ∗ 𝑀𝑅) + (𝐴 ∗ 𝑃𝑅) + 𝑋 + 𝑃 + 𝑅𝑆
The total revenue (R) was calculated by summing together the taxes paid for non-enrolled
properties, which is the product of the township’s total taxable value for real property
(TTV) and that township’s millage rate (MR), the taxes paid for enrolled properties,
which is the product of the total acres enrolled (A) and the program’s tax rate (PR), the
state reimbursement payment for properties enrolled in the forest tax programs (X), PILT
payments made for federal and state lands (P), and revenue sharing payments (RS). For
Michigan the state reimburses townships at the same rate that is levied on the enrolled
properties, the $1.30 per acre of enrolled land. For Wisconsin the state reimburses the
townships at $0.20 per acre of enrolled land.
Hypothetical scenarios were run to simulate the effect of increases in enrolled
forestland on townships’ millage rates, again assuming total revenue (R) remained
constant. Three scenarios of a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in enrolled acres were run for
each township, and a new millage rate was calculated based on the changes in enrollment.

𝑀𝑅 = (𝑅 − (𝐴 ∗ (1 + 𝑟) ∗ 𝑃𝑅) − 𝑋 − 𝑃 − 𝑅𝑆)/(𝑇𝑇𝑉 −

𝐴 ∗ (1 + 𝑟) − 𝐴 ∗ 𝑇𝑉)

For each simulated increase in enrollment, total tax revenues from enrolled properties
was calculated by multiplying the acres enrolled in the forest tax program in 2018 (A) by
the percent increase (1+r) and then by the program’s tax rate (PR). The total taxable value
for each township was adjusted to account for the acres of forestland enrolled in the
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respective forest tax program. Thus, the adjusted total taxable value for the township was
calculated by subtracting taxable value of the property that was taken out of the tax base
and added to the forest tax program, which is the change in enrolled acres multiplied by
its pre-enrollment taxable value (TV), from the original total taxable value (TTV). For
Michigan, assumed taxable values for forestland were used across the townships because
taxable value data for individual properties is not readily available. These assumed
taxable values for MI were informed by actual taxable values for timber cut-over land, 40
acres or more, in Houghton County, which were provided by the Houghton County
Equalization Department. Based on that report, the average taxable value of forested
properties classified as timber cut-over is $199 per acre, with a range in taxable value
from $21 to $1,225 per acre (See Appendix A). For Wisconsin, tax parcel data were used
to derive average taxable values of properties 20 acres or more in classification 6
(productive forest). The average taxable value of productive forested land for each
township was then used in the model.
The simulated changes in tax levy that would be applied to non-enrolled properties
was calculated by subtracting from the total revenue (R) the new tax levy from enrolled
properties and the state reimbursement (X), PILT (P), and revenue sharing (RS)
payments. The new millage rate (MR) could then be calculated by dividing the new tax
levy paid by non-enrolled properties by the new total taxable value. The new millage rate
was then subtracted from the 2018 actual millage rate to determine how much it changed,
and this was then multiplied by 10,000 to determine the township’s change in tax levy per
$10,000 taxable value. The new millage rate (MR) could then be calculated by dividing
the new tax levy paid by non-enrolled properties by the new total taxable value.

2.3 Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was conducted showing the average changes in tax levies
across different enrollment scenarios for each State. There were five different taxable
value scenarios run in Michigan: $50, $250, $500, $750, and $1000 taxable value per
acre. Each level of taxable value scenario was run with a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in
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CF enrollment. Three different scenarios were run in Wisconsin each with a different
ratio between the proportion of enrolled acres in the open and closed classifications to
account for the different tax rates associated with each. The increase in MFL enrollment
in both open and closed lands were simulated at its current ratio, new enrollment only in
the open category, and new enrollment only in the closed category. Each of these three
different scenarios were run showing a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in total MFL
enrollment within each township. Descriptive statistics showing the mean change in tax
levy per $10,000 taxable value were calculated for each scenario.

2.4 Correlation Analysis
A correlation analysis was run to see what possible variables are correlated with
townships’ change in tax levy with an increase in program enrollment. A correlation
coefficient value of -1 indicates a perfect negative relationship between two variables,
meaning that as one variable increases the other decreases, a value of 1 indicates a perfect
positive relationship, meaning that as one variable increases the other increases, and a
correlation value of 0 indicates no relationship. Two different types of correlation
coefficients were used to measure the correlation between the townships change in tax
levy and the other variables: Spearman correlation (ρ), and Kendall’s tau correlation (τ).
Both correlations are useful for quantitative or ordinal data, and they both indicate how
strongly two variables are monotonically related (van den Berg, n.d.). Unlike the
Pearson’s correlation, they do not carry the assumption that the data needs to follow a
normal distribution, which is why these measures were preferred over Pearson’s
correlation as the change in tax levy variable is not normally distributed.
IBM SPSS Statistics Software was used for the correlation analysis. Four different
scenarios were run for Michigan: change in tax levy with 10% increase in CF enrollment
at $200, $300, $400, and $500 taxable values per acre. For Wisconsin, the same three
enrollment ratio scenarios from the sensitivity analysis were run, each showing the
change in tax levy with a 10% increase in MFL enrollment. The variables examined as
correlates with the change in tax levy included population density, median household
income, median house value, the proportion of housing units that were owner-occupied,
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renter-occupied, and vacant, the proportion of owner-occupied housing units where the
owner moved in before 2010 and after 2010, the proportion of land area that was either
enrolled in CF or MFL, the proportion of the township’s total revenue that came from
enrolled properties/state reimbursement, non-enrolled properties, PILT payments from
federal and state lands, and revenue sharing payments, and the proportion of total MFL
land that was open and enrolled from 1987-2004, closed and enrolled from 1987-2004,
open and enrolled after 2005, and closed and enrolled after 2005 (Table 3). Descriptive
statistics were also calculated for each of the independent variables.
Population density and housing data were included in the analysis because of their
relationship to a township’s available property tax base, and to examine how shifts in tax
burdens may be impacting rural townships with smaller tax bases, less property value,
and smaller incomes. The number of properties already enrolled in the forest tax
programs, and the amount of revenue coming from those properties, would also give an
indication of the township’s available tax base, as one would expect that a township with
a greater proportion of land already enrolled would have fewer properties left in the tax
base to shift the tax burden onto, thereby resulting in the township’s change in tax levy to
increase with increasing enrollment. The proportion of revenue coming from PILT and
revenue sharing payments variables were included to examine if those additional
revenues are in any way helping to reduce the township’s sensitivity to increases in
program enrollment. The different MFL enrollment categories were included to better
understand if properties enrolled in a certain category cause a greater effect on the
township’s change in tax levy. Since lands enrolled before 2005 pay much more reduced
taxes, as well as open land enrolled after 2005, it is expected that these variables would
have a positive relationship with the township’s change in tax levy. It is expected for the
closed lands enrolled after 2005 to have a negative association with the township’s
change in tax levy. Since a higher tax fee is levied on closed lands, a higher proportion of
them in a township may reduce the township’s sensitivity to increases in enrollment as a
reduced tax revenues would be expected from the non-enrolled properties to make up for
the loss in tax revenue.
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Name

Table 3: Description of variables used in correlation analysis
Description

Pop. Den.

Population density per square mile

Med. Inc.

Median household income

Med. H. Val.

Median house value

% Owner

% of housing units that are owner-occupied

% Renter

% of housing units that are renter-occupied

% Vacant

% of housing units that are vacant

% of owner-occupied housing units where owner moved in
before 2010
% of owner-occupied housing units where owner moved in
% Moved post 2010
after 2010
% of total revenue that came from CF enrolled properties and
% CF Tax
state reimbursement
% Moved pre 2010

% Non-CF Tax

% PILT

% of total revenue that came from non-CF enrolled properties
% of total revenue that came from MFL enrolled properties
and state reimbursement
% of total revenue that came from non-MFL enrolled
properties
% of total revenue that came from federal/state PILT

% RS

% of total revenue that came from revenue sharing payments

% CF Land

% of total township area that is enrolled in CF

% MFL Land

% of total township area that is enrolled in MFL

% Pre 2005 Open

% of total MFL that is open and enrolled between 1987-2004

% Pre 2005 Closed

% of total MFL that is closed and enrolled between 19872004

% Post 2005 Open

% of total MFL that is open and enrolled after 2005

% MFL Tax
% Non-MFL Tax

% Post 2005 Closed % of total MFL that is closed and enrolled after 2005
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3 Results
3.1 Michigan’s Upper Peninsula – Commercial Forest Program
Currently, approximately 2.2 million acres of private forests are enrolled in the CF
program in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. Of the 149 townships in the Upper Peninsula,
129 have at least one parcel of land enrolled in the CF program and 20 of the townships
do not have any land enrolled. As this analysis is based on a percent increase in current
CF enrollment, the townships that do not have any land currently enrolled were excluded
from the analyses as any percent increase would only continue to result in zero land
enrolled.
3.1.1

Township Data
The average township has a population density of about 16.6 people per square

mile, with a range of 0.2 to 189.1 people per square mile (Table 4). The average township
has a median household annual income of around $49,005, and a median house value of
around $124,143 (Table 4). On average about 44.6% of housing units within a township
are owner-occupied while 49% are vacant, and 6.4% are renter-occupied (Table 4). Of
the owner-occupied units, an average of 72.2% had the owner moving in before 2010,
and 27.8% of the units were moved in after 2010 (Table 4). Longer-tenured owner
occupants are an important consideration for Michigan, as the state caps the rate of
increase on a property’s taxable value so that the annual increases cannot exceed the rate
of 1.05 or the inflation rate, whichever is lowest. When a transfer of ownership occurs
then the property is uncapped, and its taxable value is assessed at its current market
value. In general, longer-tenured occupants pay lower property taxes than those who
recently purchased a piece a property, due to the rate of taxable value increase being
capped at the year when the purchase was made.
Of all the townships that currently have properties enrolled in the CF program, on
average about 20.6% of the total township land area consists of CF land, with some
townships having as low as 0.1% of CF land and some having as much as 86.9% of their
land area enrolled in the program (Table 4). Of the total property tax revenue that is
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received by the township, an average of 75.8% comes from the non-CF enrolled
properties, 10.7% from PILT payments from federal and state lands, 8.2% from revenue
sharing payments from the state, and 4.9% from CF enrolled properties and the state
reimbursement (Table 4).

Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables in study
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
16.6
26.42
0.2
189.1
Pop. Den. (per sq. mi.)
$49,005
$9,704.27 $26,667
$79,250
Med. Inc.
$124,143 $41,355.80 $48,800 $272,200
Med. H. Val.
44.6
16.66
4.5
90.6
% Owner
6.4
6.49
0.0
40.8
% Renter
49.0
19.75
2.3
94.8
% Vacant
72.2
8.18
41.4
88.9
% Moved pre-2010
27.8
8.18
11.1
58.6
% Moved post-2010
20.6
19.06
0.1
86.9
% CF Land
% CF Tax
4.9
5.69
0.01
31.1
% PILT
10.7
11.73
0
59.2
% Non-CF Tax
75.8
12.31
33.7
95.0
% RS
8.2
5.16
1.3
31.1
% Townships with at
86.6
least 1 CF parcel

N
129
127
127
129
129
129
129
129
129
129
129
129
129

Note: Only includes the 129 townships that currently have CF land, excludes 20 townships that do not
currently have land enrolled in CF

3.1.2

Simulation Results
The acreage of forested land that is still available in a township to be enrolled in

the CF program was estimated using GIS, to determine if the percent increase in
enrollment is even possible. This was determined using land cover data from the National
Land Cover Database, and shapefiles from the state’s website showing acreages of land
enrolled in the CF program, as well as federal and state-owned land. Individual parcel
data was not readily available for Michigan, so the estimate is based on total available
forested acreage disregarding individual parcel size. There was one township for which a
5%, 10%, and 15% increase was not possible due to limited acreage of available forest,
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and another township for which a 15% increase was not possible. These townships were
excluded from the analyses for the scenarios at which a percent increase was no longer
possible.
Overall, tax rates increased for non-CF properties as a result of increased
enrollment in CF across all combinations of percent increase and assumed taxable value
of non-enrolled forestland (Fig. 4). The increase in the tax levy is higher when the
forested property is valued at a higher taxable value and when there is a greater increase
in program enrollment (Table 5). Higher valued properties pay higher taxes than lower
valued properties, so it would be a greater loss to the township’s tax revenue if that
higher property was to be removed from the property tax base and enrolled in a forest tax
program. Higher increases in program enrollment would also result in higher tax rate
increases as more properties are being removed from the tax base, causing a greater shift
in the tax burden for the remaining properties. For forested properties that qualify for
enrollment (productive forests over 40 acres), with an assumed value $500 per acre, and
assuming a 10% increase in program enrollment, non-enrolled properties would see their
tax bills increase by $5.15 per $10,000 taxable value (Table 5), which is a 2.32%
increase. Assuming a taxable value of $1,000 per forested acre, and a 10% increase in
program enrollment, the non-enrolled properties experience an average tax levy increase
of $13.26 per $10,000 taxable value across all townships (Table 5), which is a 5.99%
increase in the tax rate. In contrast, assuming low taxable values of properties, increasing
enrollment in CF resulted in a reduction in the taxes levied on non-enrolled property. For
instance, a 10% increase in enrollment of forested properties with an assumed average
taxable value of $50 per acre resulted in a reduction of $0.86 per $10,000 taxable value in
the tax bills (Table 5). Properties that have such a low taxable value would actually pay
higher taxes if they were to enroll in the CF program. For example, in L’Anse township
in Baraga County where the current mill rate is 19.55, a 40-acre property valued at $50
per acre taxable value would be paying $39.10 in property taxes. If that property enrolled
in the CF program their tax bill would increase to $52, with the program’s tax rate of
$1.30 per acre. High enrollment increases of these low valued properties in the CF
program would therefore enable townships to reduce the tax rate for non-enrolled
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properties, as they would be receiving higher tax revenues. However, such a scenario is
unlikely to occur as there would be no tax incentive for the landowners to enroll. While
the average township has a rather minimal change in their millage rate with increasing
enrollment, some townships experienced much higher changes, resulting in higher tax
levies on the non-enrolled properties (Table 5).

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for change in tax levy for various CF enrollment scenarios
Change in Tax Levy per $10,000 Taxable Value
Taxable Value
Increase in
of Non-CF
Mean
Std Dev.
Min.
Max.
N
CF Land
Forest
5%
-$0.43
$0.55
-$2.43
$0.00
128
50
10%
-$0.86
$1.10
-$4.90
$0.00
128
15%
-$1.24
$1.61
-$7.41
$0.00
126
5%
$0.83
$1.37
$0.00
$8.55
128
250
10%
$1.69
$2.84
$0.00
$17.89
128
15%
$2.44
$4.26
$0.00
$28.13
126
5%
$2.45
$3.85
$0.00
$22.68
128
500
10%
$5.15
$8.33
$0.00
$49.96
128
15%
$7.65
$13.09
$0.00
$83.40
126
5%
$4.16
$6.53
$0.00
$38.17
128
750
10%
$8.97
$14.84
$0.00
$89.27
128
15%
$13.80
$24.91
$0.01
$161.20
126
5%
$5.95
$9.43
$0.00
$55.24
128
1000
10%
$13.26
$22.71
$0.01
$138.58
128
15%
$21.39
$41.73
$0.01
$278.82
126
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Figure 4: The change in tax levy per $10,000 taxable value on non-enrolled properties across
differing taxable values and increases in CF enrollment. Note: excludes 23 outliers

3.1.3

Correlation Results
Correlation coefficients were calculated to identify associations between U.S.

Census and revenue source data and changes in tax levy as a result of increased CF
enrollment (Table 6). All coefficients were significant, though the strength of the
associations varied between the different taxable value scenarios. The Spearman’s rho
correlation coefficients showed stronger relationships than the Kendall’s tau-b correlation
coefficients (Table 3). The proportion of the township’s total revenue that comes from the
payments made by CF taxpayers and the state’s reimbursement for enrollment resulted in
a strong positive correlation with the township’s change in tax levy (ρ = 0.878; τ = 0.830
at 500 TV) (Table 6; Fig. 6a). The proportion of a township’s total land area that is
enrolled in the CF program has a more moderately strong positive correlation with the
township’s change in tax levy (ρ = 0.734; τ = 0.622 at 500 TV) (Table 6; Fig. 5d).
Population density (ρ = -0.635; τ = -0.444 at 500 TV) (Fig. 5a), the proportion of housing
units that are owner-occupied (ρ = -0.490; τ = -0.335 at 500 TV) (Fig. 5b), the proportion
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of total revenue that comes from non-CF taxpayers ((ρ = -0.466; τ = -0.366 at 500 TV)
(Fig. 6b), and revenue sharing payments (ρ = -0.551; τ = -0.348 at 500 TV) (Fig. 6c) all
have moderate negative correlations with changes in tax levy for non-enrolled properties.
The proportion of vacant housing units has a moderate positive relationship with change
in tax levy (ρ = 0.510; τ = 0.350 at 500 TV) (Fig. 5c). Median household income, median
house value, the proportion of housing units that are renter-occupied, and the proportion
of housing units where the owner moved in after 2010 a weakly negatively correlated
with change in tax levy (Table 6). The proportion of housing units where the owner
moved in before 2010, and the proportion of total revenue that came from PILT payments
are weakly positively correlated with change in tax levy (Table 6).

Table 6: Correlation analysis results for all the independent variables against the
township’s change in tax levy for differing forested property taxable values
Change in Tax Levy at 10% increase
200 TV
300 TV
400 TV
500 TV
Pop. Den.
N = 128
Med. Inc.
N = 126
Med. H.
Val.
N = 126
% Owner
N = 128
% Renter
N = 128
% Vacant
N = 128
% Moved
pre 2010
N = 128
% Moved
post 2010
N = 128
% CF

ρ

τ

ρ

τ

ρ

τ

ρ

τ

-.627**

-.442**

-.625**

-.441**

-.623**

-.442**

-.618**

-.437**

-.379**

-.257**

-.383**

-.266**

-.384**

-.265**

-.381**

-.262**

-.378**

-.257**

-.370**

-.251**

-.366**

-.248**

-.363**

-.245**

-.498**

-.341**

-.488**

-.336**

-.484**

-.331**

-.480**

-.327**

-.347**

-.239**

-.345**

-.236**

-.341**

-.233**

-.337**

-.230**

.523**

.363**

.510**

.351**

.505**

.348**

.500**

.344**

.318**

.212**

.338**

.224**

.340**

.226**

.335**

.222**

-.318**

-.212**

-.338**

-.224**

-.340**

-.226**

-.335**

-.222**

.728**

.546**

.784**

.598**

.794**

.609**

.799**

.616**
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N = 128
% CF tax
N = 128
% PILT
N = 128
% NonCF tax
N = 128
% RS
N = 128

.875**

.711**

.942**

.800**

.954**

.820**

.957**

.828**

.276**

.189**

.275**

.190**

.276**

.189**

.272**

.187**

-.457**

-.302**

-.518**

-.346**

-.531**

-.357**

-.532**

-.359**

-.541**

-.376**

-.505**

-.349**

-.496**

-.342**

-.491**

-.339**

Note: ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level
ρ - Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient; τ - Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficient

a

b

c

d

Figure 5: The relationship between (a) population density; (b) the proportion of housing units that
are owner-occupied; (c) the proportion of housing units that are vacant; and (d) the proportion of
total land area that is enrolled in the CF program with the township’s change in tax levy with a
10% increase in CF enrollment with property valued at 200 taxable value, 300 taxable value, 400
taxable value, and 500 taxable value.
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a

b

c

Figure 6: The relationship between the (a) proportion of total tax revenue that comes from
properties enrolled in CF and the State reimbursement payments; (b) the proportion of total
revenue that comes from non-CF properties; and (c) the proportion of total tax revenue that
comes from revenue sharing payments with the township’s change in tax levy with a 10%
increase in CF enrollment with property valued at 200 taxable value, 300 taxable value, 400
taxable value, and 500 taxable value.

3.2 Northern Wisconsin – Managed Forest Law
There are currently about 1.2 million acres of forest enrolled in Wisconsin’s MFL
program. All 149 townships included in this study had at least one parcel enrolled in the
MFL program. About 19.2% of the total land area in the average township is enrolled in
the MFL program, with a range from 1.5% to 83.3% (Table 7). Of the MFL land that was
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enrolled prior to 2005, an average of about 29.6% was enrolled in the open category and
26.4% in the closed category (Table 7). Of the MFL land that was enrolled after 2005 to
the present, an average of 14.1% is enrolled in the open category and 29.9% is enrolled in
the closed category (Table 7). These differences in the enrollment category is an
important consideration as they pay differing tax rates. Open MFL land enrolled prior to
2005 makes tax payments at $0.74 per acre, closed MFL land enrolled prior to 2005 pays
$1.75 per acre, open MFL land enrolled after 2005 pays $2.04 per acre, and closed MFL
land enrolled after 2005 pays $10.20 per acre in taxes.
3.2.1

Township Data
The average population density in the WI townships included in this study is 13.5

people per square mile, with a range between 0.7 to 66.5 people per square mile (Table
8). The average median household income is $51,481 and the median house value is
$147,303 (Table 8). The average township has a greater proportion of vacant housing
units (50.6%) with 43.4% of the housing units being owner-occupied, and 6% being
renter-occupied (Table 8).
Unlike Michigan, average taxable value was based on tax parcel data, where the
average taxable value of productive forested property in parcels greater than 20 acres was
calculated for each township. The average taxable value of all the non-enrolled forested
property is $1613 per acre, with a range from $428 to $2,839 per acre. Of the total
property tax revenue generated that came into the various townships in 2018, an average
of 70.2% came from non-MFL enrolled properties, 10.6% from federal/state PILT
payments, 10% from revenue sharing payments, and 9.2% from MFL enrolled properties
and the state reimbursement (Table 8). For some townships the payments from MFL
properties and the state reimbursement made up as much as 37.6% of the total tax
revenue and as little as 0.6% of the total revenue (Table 8).
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the different MFL land enrollment categories
Mean Std. Dev. Min
Max
N
% MFL Land
19.2
14.43
1.5
83.3
149
% Pre 2005 Open
29.6
25.80
0.0
98.1
149
% Pre 2005 Closed
26.4
15.60
1.1
66.7
149
% Post 2005 Open
14.1
10.93
0.0
51.3
149
% Post 2005 Closed
29.9
17.62
0.0
80.5
149

Table 8: Descriptive statistics for independent variables in study
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Pop. Den.
13.5
13.86
0.7
66.5
Med. Inc.
$51,481
$10,604 $25,694 $94,375
Med. H. Val.
$147,303 $37,912 $59,000 $272,100
% Owner
43.4
17.61
10.6
89.1
% Renter
6.0
4.85
0.2
36.8
% Vacant
50.6
19.69
3.1
88.0
% Moved pre 2010
73.4
6.63
55.9
95.8
% Moved post 2010
26.6
6.6
4.2
44.14
TV of Forestland*
1613
356.3
428
2839
% MFL Tax
9.2
5.86
0.6
37.6
% Non-MFL Tax
70.2
15.71
12.7
93.8
% PILT
10.6
15.37
0.0
83.8
% RS
10.0
8.71
0.4
49.2

N
149
149
148
149
149
149
149
149
149
149
149
149
149

* Property classification code: 6

3.2.2

Simulation Results
Acreage of available forests that could potentially be enrolled was estimated for

each township from tax parcel data. Available acreage was based on properties that are
classified as productive forest (classification 6) and that are 20 acres or more, which is
the MFL minimum acreage requirement. There are 10 townships for which a 5%
enrollment increase is not possible, due to limited acreage of available forested
properties, 20 townships for whom a 10% increase is not possible, and 34 townships for
whom a 15% increase is not possible. These townships were excluded from the analyses.
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Within each of the three different enrollment scenarios between open and closed lands, as
enrollment increases the mean change in tax levy also increases (Table 9 and Fig. 7). The
scenario that assumes all new enrollment is in the open category had the highest average
change in tax levy, and the scenario where all the increasing enrollment goes in the
closed category had the lowest average change in tax levy (Table 9 and Fig. 7). For the
open scenario, with a 10% increase in enrollment, the mean tax levy increases by $12.21
per $10,000 taxable value in the average township, which is about an 8.2% increase in the
tax rate.
Assuming a 10% increase in new enrollment and assuming the current ratio of
closed to open enrollment, the average township experiences an increase in mean tax levy
for non-enrolled property of $10.17 per $10,000 taxable value, which is a 6.8% increase
in the tax rate. With a 10% increase enrollment in the closed scenario, the average tax
levy increases by $6.98 per $10,000 taxable value, which is an 4.6% increase in the tax
rate. There is a wide range across the townships in their tax levy changes with increasing
enrollment, with some townships experiencing rather minimal changes in their tax levy
and others much higher changes. In the closed scenario there were even some townships
that experienced a reduction in the tax levy (Table 9).

Table 9: Descriptive statistics for the change in tax levy for different MFL enrollment
scenarios
Change in Tax Levy per $10,000 Taxable Value
Open vs
Increase in
Std.
Closed
Mean
Min
Max
N
MFL Land
Dev.
Ratio
$5.09
$6.06
$0.14
$34.80
5%
139
Current
$10.17
$14.62
$0.28
$97.29
10%
129
$11.71
$13.53
$0.43
$120.38
15%
115
$6.09
$6.44
$0.22
$36.30
5%
139
Open
$12.21
$15.42
$0.43
$101.48
10%
129
$14.70
$14.67
$0.65
$126.77
15%
115
$3.55
$3.68
-$1.24
$21.84
5%
139
Closed
$6.98
$8.06
-$2.53
$55.15
10%
129
$8.93
$9.33
-$3.89
$71.49
15%
115
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Figure 7: The change in tax levy per $10,000 taxable value on non-enrolled properties for
the different MFL enrollment scenarios. Note: excludes 32 outliers

3.2.3

Correlation Analysis
All the correlation analyses were conducted with a 10% enrollment increase

within each of the three enrollment ratio scenarios. The proportion of land area enrolled
in the MFL program has a moderately strong positive correlation when considering ρ
correlation coefficient (Current - ρ = 0.751; Open - ρ = 0.759; Closed - ρ = 0.713), and a
more moderate positive correlation when considering τ correlation coefficient (Current - τ
= 0.571; Open - τ = 0.577; Closed - τ = 0.535) that is significant with a township’s
change in tax levy across each of the three scenarios (Table 10; Fig. 8a). The proportion
of total revenue that comes from MFL taxes and the state reimbursement also has a
significant positive correlation with change in tax levy that is moderately strong when
looking at ρ correlation coefficient (Current - ρ = 0.695; Open - ρ = 0.0.732; Closed - ρ =
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0.691) and more moderate when looking at τ correlation coefficient (Current - τ = 0.521;
Open - τ = 0.556; Closed - τ = 0.516) (Table 10; Fig. 8d).
The proportion of MFL lands that were enrolled in the open category prior to
2005 has a moderate positive correlation with change in tax levy in the current ratio (ρ =
0.590; τ = 0.426) and fully open (ρ = 0.551; τ = 0.395) scenarios, but a moderately-weak
positive correlation in the fully closed (ρ = 0.426; τ = 0.306) scenario (Table 10; Fig. 8b).
The proportion of MFL lands enrolled in the closed category after 2005 has a moderate
negative correlation with change in tax levy in the current ratio (ρ = -0.549; τ = -0.400)
and fully open (ρ = -0.518; τ = -0.376) scenarios, and a moderately-weak negative
correlation in the fully closed (ρ = -0.384; τ = -0.281) scenario (Table 10; Fig. 8c). The
proportion of MFL lands enrolled in the closed category prior to 2005, the proportion of
total revenue that comes from non-MFL enrolled properties, population density, and the
proportion of owner-occupied housing units all have significant weak negative
correlations with a township’s change in tax levy (Table 10). The proportion of vacant
housing units has a significant weak positive correlation with a township’s change in tax
levy (Table 10). Median household income, median house value, the proportion of
housing units that are renter-occupied, the proportion of housing units where the owner
had moved in either before or after 2010, the average taxable value of forested property,
the proportion of total revenue that came from either PILT or revenue sharing payments,
and the proportion of MFL lands that were enrolled in the open category after 2005 all
are insignificantly correlated with a township’s change in tax levy from increasing
enrollment (Table 10).
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Table 10: Correlation analysis results for all the independent variables against the
township’s change in tax levy for the differing MFL enrollment scenarios
Change in Tax Levy with 10% enrollment increase
Current Ratio
Open
Closed
ρ
τ
ρ
τ
ρ
τ
**
**
**
**
*
-.303
-.217
-.308
-.216
-.193
-.135*
Pop. Den.
N = 129
-0.145
-0.100 -0.154
-0.106
-0.079
-0.051
Med. Inc.
N = 129
-0.148
-0.095 -0.160
-0.105
-0.125
-0.088
Med. H. Val.
N = 128
-.238** -.163** -.252** -.171**
-.184*
-.124*
% Owner
N = 129
-0.124
-0.085 -0.125
-0.081
-0.099
-0.064
% Renter
N = 129
.229**
.156**
.240**
.163**
.194*
.129*
% Vacant
N = 129
% Moved pre
0.106
0.068
0.096
0.066
0.036
0.022
2010
N = 129
% Moved post
-0.106
-0.068 -0.096
-0.066
-0.036
-0.022
2010
N = 129
-0.116
-0.083 -0.111
-0.078
0.074
0.052
TV
N = 129
.678**
.501**
.725**
.542**
.678**
.499**
% MFL Tax
N = 129
-.301** -.216** -.294** -.210** -.242** -.172**
% Non-MFL Tax
N = 129
0.139
0.095
0.128
0.088
0.138
0.094
% PILT
N = 129
-0.111
-0.072 -0.134
-0.086
-0.129
-0.086
% RS
N = 129
.708**
.530**
.719**
.538**
.661**
.489**
% MFL Land
N = 129
.542**
.389**
.495**
.352**
.339**
.244**
% Pre 2005 Open
N = 129
% Pre 2005
-.314** -.221** -.256** -.176** -0.142
-0.100
Closed
N = 129
0.096
0.103
0.074
0.110
0.077
% Post 2005 Open 0.137
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N = 129
% Post 2005
Closed
N = 129

-.481**

-.346**

-.444**

-.319**

-.283**

-.208**

Note: * Correlation is significant at 0.05 level; ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level
ρ - Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient; τ - Kendall’s tau-b correlation coefficients

a

b

c

d

Figure 8: The relationship between the (a) proportion of total land area that is enrolled in MFL;
(b) the proportion of open MFL land that was enrolled prior to 2005; (c) the proportion of closed
MFL land that was enrolled after 2005; and (d) the proportion of total revenue that comes from
MFL properties and State reimbursement with the township’s change in tax levy with a 10%
increase in MFL enrollment across three different enrollment scenarios: at the current open/closed
ratio, increase in just open, and increase in just closed category.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Variability of shifting tax burdens
Increasing enrollment in forest tax programs can result in subsequent increases in a
township’s property tax rate, assuming that the township needs to maintain a constant tax
revenue, which shifts the tax burden onto non-enrolled properties. This increase occurs
because the township’s tax base is reduced due to forestland being enrolled in a forest tax
program and therefore no longer subject to local tax rates. Based on these simulated
results, the effect of the tax shift is relatively small for most townships in Michigan’s
Upper Peninsula and northern Wisconsin. However, there is a range in sensitivity
amongst the townships to changes in program enrollment, with some townships
experiencing much higher property tax rate increases and others rather minimal changes
to the tax rate with increasing enrollment. For example, while the average township in the
Upper Peninsula experienced a 2.3% tax rate increase with a 10% increase in CF
enrollment assuming forest properties are valued at $500 taxable value (See Appendix
A), individual townships ranged in tax increases from as low as 0.002% to as high as
16.8%. The variability was even greater in northern Wisconsin, where the average
township experienced a 6.8% increase in the tax rate with a 10% increase in MFL
enrollment at the current ratio of opened to closed enrollment types, but the range in tax
rate increase fell between 0.002% to 64.7%.
A wide range in sensitivity to changes in program enrollment has also been seen in
past studies. Dunford and Marousek (1981) found that tax rate increases ranged from
1.1% to 21.9% in Spokane County, Washington, due to increases in enrollment in the
use-value assessment program for farmland. Rickenbach and Saunders (2009) reported
similar findings in Wisconsin, where some townships experienced only slight changes in
the tax rate while others experienced much larger changes with changes in MFL
enrollment.
The results of this study indicate that the difference in sensitivity seems to be
connected with the ruralness of a township and the size of its tax base, which includes all
the non-enrolled properties. This result is similar to findings from past studies (Dunford
and Marousek, 1981; Brighton, 1993; Rickenbach and Saunders, 2009). According to the
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correlation analysis, the proportion of enrolled land in a township had the strongest
positive correlation with the change in tax levy per $10,000 of taxable value, along with
the proportion of revenue that comes from the enrolled properties, which includes State
reimbursements (Tables 6 and 10). This result suggest that a higher proportion of enrolled
forestland reduces the available tax base, thereby shifting the tax burden to make up for
the lost revenue to fewer properties that have a relatively small combined taxable value.
For example, a township with 60% of its land area enrolled in a forest tax program would
mean only 40% of the land includes property that is subject to adjustment in millage rates
that would be required to make up for reduced tax revenues as a result of increases in
forest tax program enrollment. Arguably, non-enrolled properties would feel the tax shift
more heavily in a township with a smaller tax base than would non-enrolled properties in
a township with a larger tax base, as there are fewer properties available to shift the
burden onto.
A smaller population density suggests a more rural township, and also may indicate
a relatively smaller tax base. Population density was negatively correlated with changes
in tax rates, although this relationship was much weaker in Wisconsin than in Michigan
(Tables 6 and 10). This result may suggest that increased enrollment into a forest tax
programs in low population density townships shift the tax burden onto fewer properties,
which would mean that they would have to bear a greater share to make up for the loss in
tax revenue due to the increasing enrollment in the forest tax program.
A negative association was observed between the proportion of housing units that
are owner-occupied and the change in tax rate for non-enrolled properties. The more
sensitive townships in Michigan were those that only had about 20-40% of its housing
units being owner-occupied, with about 60-80% being vacant (Fig 5b and 5c). A higher
proportion of owner-occupied units in a township could suggest a larger tax base and
hence more properties available to shift the burden of the property tax onto, leading to a
smaller change in tax levy for that township. In Michigan it is also important to note that
owner-occupied units are subject to a cap on their property taxes. When a property is
purchased in Michigan, the rate of increase in the property’s taxable value becomes
capped so that it cannot exceed 1.05 or the inflation rate, whichever is less. The taxes
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being levied on these units may be even lower than what it would normally be based on
the current market value of that property, depending on the tenure of ownership.
Considering this aspect, it is difficult to explain why there is a negative correlation
between change in tax levy and proportion of owner-occupied units, as the taxable value
of the property depends on the tenure of the current owner as well as the market value.
They could be paying much lower taxes if the unit has been occupied by its current owner
for several years, or the taxes could be relatively higher if the unit has been more recently
purchased and its property uncapped.
The proportion of housing units that are classified as vacant has a positive
correlation in Michigan and Wisconsin, meaning that the greater the percent of vacant
units, the higher the change in tax levy, according to the simulation. However, this result
is difficult to interpret because the vacant classification includes both vacation homes that
are not listed as the primary residence of the owner and units that are abandoned. It
would be expected that a higher proportion of vacation homes would result in a lower
change in tax levy as a result of increased forest tax program enrollment assuming such
homes are higher valued properties. Moreover, the cap applied to the rate of increase of a
property’s taxable value is not applicable to second homes, only to properties of primary
residence in Michigan. In contrast, if a township has a high proportion of truly vacant
units (i.e. abandoned) that would be assumed to have low values, then the townships
would likely receive little tax revenues from such units. However, since this difference
cannot be distinguished in the variable it is hard to conclude what is causing this variable
to have positive relationship with the change in tax levy.
This capping of the rate of taxable value increase on owner-occupied units in
Michigan would also explain why the year that the owner moved into the unit would be
significant, although the correlation for that variable is rather weak (Table 6). The lower
the proportion of owner-occupied units where the owner moved in before 2010, the lower
the change in tax levy experienced in the township, and the higher the proportion of
owner-occupied units where the owner moved in after 2010, the higher the change in tax
levy. Under Michigan’s capping law, when ownership is transferred the property’s
taxable value is uncapped and is set at 50% of its true cash value. Thus, more recently
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purchased properties tend to pay higher property taxes than properties that have not
changed ownership for many years as the property’s value would have increased to its
current market value. Wisconsin does not cap the rate of increase of taxable values of
properties at time of purchase, which no doubt explains why these variables are not
significantly correlated with the township’s change in tax levy for that state.

4.2 Open vs Closed MFL Properties
There are two categories of enrollment for the MFL program in Wisconsin landowners can opt to have their land either open or closed to the public. This is unlike
the CF program where all enrolled properties are required to be open to the public for
recreational purposes, such as hunting, trapping, and fishing. In Wisconsin, MFL
properties kept open to the public are subject to a lower fixed tax rate of $2.04 per acre,
whereas closed properties are subject to a $10.20 per acre fixed rate. There is also a
difference in tax rates depending on when the property was enrolled. If enrolled between
1987 and 2004, properties are taxed at $0.74 per acre for open land and $1.75 for closed
land. According to the simulations, the proportion of land enrolled in these MFL
categories correlated with a township’s sensitivity. Townships with a higher proportion of
open land that was enrolled before 2005 tend to be the ones most sensitive to changes in
further enrollment, having higher changes in tax levy. With such a reduced tax rate, pre2005 open enrollments resulted in a greater shift in the tax burden, as more tax revenue
would need to come from the remaining properties in the tax base to offset the reduced
revenue coming from the enrolled properties. Closed lands enrolled after 2005 had the
opposite correlation, where a higher proportion of closed properties correlated with a
lower change in tax levy for the townships. These properties pay a much higher tax rate
than MFL properties in the other categories, and for some townships this rate is even
greater than what the non-enrolled properties are being levied. For example, in Sanborn
township in Ashland County the average tax levy per acre on non-enrolled properties is
$2.03 per acre. In these instances, closed MFL properties are paying even more in taxes
than the non-enrolled properties, which would make sense why higher enrollment would
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end up aiding the townships making them less sensitive to further changes in enrollment.
Sanborn township was even seen to experience a reduction in its tax rate with increasing
enrollment in the closed category (Table 9). Interestingly the proportion of open MFL
land enrolled after 2005 does not have any correlation with a township’s change in tax
levy (Table 10). With the reduced rates on open land in general, the scenario where 100%
of the increasing enrollment occurred in the open category was seen to have the highest
changes in tax levy for the average township (Fig. 7). Though based on the correlations,
the proportion of open land enrolled before 2005 has a greater influence on a township’s
sensitivity to further increases in enrollment than the open land enrolled after 2005. This
is most likely due to the much lower rates that are levied on pre-2005 open properties. It
makes sense that the shifting of the tax burden in a township would be more influenced
by its proportion of open lands that were enrolled before 2005 than of any other category,
as more revenue is lost from those enrolled properties. For some townships as well the
tax rate levied on open lands enrolled after 2005 is not much different from the current
average tax levy per acre on non-enrolled properties, such as is the case for Sanborn
township. This could also explain why the proportion of those enrolled properties does
not have a significant relationship with a township’s sensitivity.
For Michigan different scenarios were simulated with different assumed taxable
values of forested property before being enrolled into the program. The correlations were
the same across differing taxable values, showing that the relationship between increasing
enrollment and change in tax levy is the same no matter what the taxable value is. The
sensitivity analysis, however, shows higher average changes in tax levy with higher
valued properties than with lower valued properties. This is logical, as the townships
would experience a greater loss in tax revenue if the properties that were removed from
the tax base were more valuable. Lower valued properties would not impose as great a
loss, and the property tax rate would not need to increase as much. In the Wisconsin
analyses the actual average taxable value of forested properties was known for each
township, so the values could be added to the correlation as another variable. However,
for Wisconsin, the taxable value of a forested property was not seen to have a significant
correlation with the townships change in tax levy.
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4.3 PILT and Revenue Sharing
Federal and state lands as well are exempt from property taxes, but to make up for
this loss in property taxes, they make a payment-in-lieu of taxes to the municipalities.
Both the States of Michigan and Wisconsin also contribute revenue sharing payments to
the municipalities to help the local governments offset any losses they may be
experiencing. Both of these types of payments were accounted for in this study. In the
Upper Peninsula, both the PILT and revenue sharing payments are significantly
correlated with a townships change in tax levy, though the revenue sharing payments
have a stronger relationship than the PILT payments (Table 6). The more help that a
township receives through the revenue sharing payments, the less sensitive they are to
changes in CF enrollment (Fig. 6c). The most sensitive townships had less than 10% of
their revenue coming from revenue sharing payments. In Michigan, the constitutional
revenue sharing program distributes revenue to the municipalities according to
population, so it makes sense that the most sensitive townships, which have a lower
population, would receive smaller payments. With less additional revenue, these rural,
low population townships with high amounts of CF land may be even more likely to
increase taxes on non-enrolled properties to make up for the loss in tax revenue from
increasing enrollment. PILT payments from the federal and state lands had a positive
relationship with the township’s change in tax levy, though a relatively weak one. The
higher the proportion of total revenue that came from PILT, the higher the township’s
change in tax levy. This is probably because a higher PILT payment would mean a higher
acreage of land that is federal or state owned, and therefore would mean a lower available
tax base in that township, making it more sensitive to changes in CF enrollment. As the
PILT payments are positively correlated, it would seem that they do not provide
significant aid to the townships. This may mean that the payments being currently paid
are not high enough to offset the township’s loss in property tax revenues. The PILT and
revenue sharing payments are not significantly correlated with a townships change in tax
levy in northern Wisconsin. It seems then that such payments neither aid nor cause harm
to the townships, as there is no real correlation between how much additional revenue a
township receives with the its sensitivity to changes in enrollment. Rickenbach and
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Saunders (2009) in their study found that the more sensitive townships in Wisconsin to
changes in MFL enrollment were indeed receiving a lower amount in revenue sharing
payments, and they noted that the revenue sharing payments in Wisconsin were frozen at
the 2003 levels and were no longer being adjusted for any future changes in the land use
classifications. As our findings do not demonstrate a significant correlation between
revenue sharing payments and the townships sensitivity to changes in enrollment, it may
suggest that the payments are indeed not sufficient enough to offset any losses in tax
revenue experienced by the townships. If the payments were providing sufficient aid to
the townships it would be expected then to see the less sensitive townships receiving
higher revenue sharing payments.

4.4 Realistic changes in enrollment
This study implemented hypothetical increases in forest tax program enrollment,
running scenarios with a 5%, 10%, and 15% increase in enrollment. While the results
presented here reflect the changes in tax levy with such levels of increase, in reality the
effect may be much smaller as such increases are rarely seen on a year-to-year basis. In
Michigan, enrollment in the CF program has changed slightly over the last few years. The
large boom in enrollment was around 1980, and since then new enrollment acreage has
steadily decreased (Fig. 9). While the number of applications has slightly increased over
recent years (Fig. 10), the actual acreage enrolled has been rather minimal, though it can
be seen that new acres are enrolled into the program every year (Fig. 9). According to the
National Woodland Owner Survey (NWOS), enrollment of family forests in property tax
programs in Michigan has increased slightly over the last few years. In 2013 fewer than
1% of family forests were enrolled in such programs, accounting for 4.8% of the acreage
(Butler et al. 2016a). In 2018 family owner participation has increased to 3%, accounting
for 11% of the acreage (Butler et al. 2020). According to Michigan’s Department of
Natural Resources, though, the change in enrollment on a yearly basis is minimal as the
new acreage enrolled nearly equals the acreage that is withdrawn from the program (K.
Maidlow 2020, personal communication, 9 December). For Wisconsin, family forest
owner participation in property tax programs has slightly decreased by ownership, but the
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actual acreage of forests enrolled has increased. According to NWOS, in 2013 about
21.8% of family forest owners were enrolled in a property tax program, accounting for
36.6% of the acreage (Butler et al. 2016b). In 2018 the acreage enrolled increased to
39%, but family ownerships decreased slightly to 21% (Butler et al. 2020). Looking at
total MFL acreage, including both family forest owners and private corporations, the
actual change in acreage has only slightly increased by around 1% every year (Table 11)
(Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2019). When properties are withdrawn from the
program they are required to pay a withdrawal fee which goes to the municipalities, to
make up for the property taxes that have not been being paid on the property. This study
did not consider decreasing enrollment and did not include withdrawal penalties as a
source of revenue for the townships, as the amount paid depends on several factors
including how long the property was enrolled in the program and the property’s acreage.
However, this additional source of revenue would help to mitigate any losses in tax
revenue from the properties that are enrolled in the townships, and may help to reduce the
shift in the tax burden.
While the average township may be only minimally affected by increasing
enrollment, it is clear that this affect is not uniform across all the townships and some are
much more sensitive. In the Upper Peninsula, Baraga and Keweenaw Counties in
particular are both noted for their large percentages of land being held in the CF and other
conservation programs, and in Baraga County local citizens have expressed their
concerns over the county’s declining tax base, due to the large enrollment of land in the
CF program, and the townships’ ability to generate revenue (Drue, 2021). The results of
this study show that these concerns are legitimate, as enrollment in forest tax programs
can cause property tax rates to increase on non-enrolled properties, particularly more so
in rural townships with a smaller available tax base, such as those in Baraga and
Keweenaw Counties in Michigan.
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4.5 Study limitations
4.5.1

Other preferential tax programs
This study focused only on two forest tax programs, CF in Michigan and MFL in

Wisconsin, but there are other preferential tax programs that offer reduced property taxes,
such as the Qualified Forest Program in Michigan, as well as conservation trusts where
the enrolled properties are completely exempt from paying taxes. These other programs
were not taken into consideration in this study, but may have an effect on a township’s
property tax rate as enrollment would further reduce the tax base and cause shifts in the
tax burden. Rickenbach and Saunders (2009) found that the more sensitive townships in
Wisconsin to changes in MFL enrollment also were townships that had more land
enrolled in the Agricultural Forest classification, a program that also reduces property
taxes for qualifying properties. Michigan also has a Qualified Agricultural classification
where qualifying agricultural properties can be exempt from certain local school
operating taxes up to 18 mills. However, future research is needed to determine how
these other tax reduction programs may be affecting the local municipalities and to study
if there is more or less of a tax reduction compared to the CF and MFL forest tax
programs.
4.5.2

Benefits of forest tax programs
This study did not take into account the benefits of forest tax programs. Forests

provide multiple ecosystem services, including timber, protection of wildlife habitat, and
recreational opportunities, especially for the CF and open MFL properties which are open
to the public for hunting and other recreational activities. These programs also require the
enrolled properties to conduct timber harvests, which makes forestry related industries an
important contributor to the local economy, Wisconsin in particular being ranked second
out of the top ten states nationwide where a large percentage of its GDP is attributed to
forestry related industries, contributing about 5% (Pelkki and Sherman, 2019). Forestry is
an important contributor to the economy in the Upper Peninsula. For example, in the
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Western region of the Upper Peninsula, the forestry industry accounts for 14% of labor
income, 13% of employment, and 16% of output, while the Eastern region contributes
3% of labor income, employment, and output (Leefers, 2016). The forest products
industry is the leading manufacturer employer in the Eastern Region, and in the Western
region accounts for over one third of manufacturing jobs (Leefers, 2016).
Forests can also indirectly affect the local economy in ways other than through
the forest products industries. For instance, private forests open for public recreation
promote tourism, which contributes to local businesses. Conservation of large tracts of
forested land increases the aesthetic appeal of an area, furthering the appeal for both the
tourists and the local citizens. In Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and Northern Wisconsin
regions, forests enrolled in the USDA Forest Legacy Program, which is a federal
conservation program, were found to contribute about $6.9 million in total output in the
recreation industry, as well as about $138 million in output in the timber industry,
including both direct and secondary effects (Murray et al., 2018). While forest tax
programs can reduce a township’s tax base and cause property tax rates to increase on
non-enrolled properties, these programs also help to conserve forests and to prevent them
from converting to non-forest use and development. The benefits received from forests
could help to mitigate any negative effects felt by the townships, particularly in the more
sensitive and rural townships. Future research is needed to consider the economic
contributions of forest tax programs, particularly in rural municipalities, to determine if
the benefits outweigh the costs of enrollment in these forest tax programs.
4.5.3

Short-term vs long-term trends
It is also important to note that this study is based upon only one year of tax data,

and does not show the effects that enrollment has on the property tax rates over a long
period of time. In a study by King and Anderson (2004) on the effects of conservation
easements, they found that in the short-term program enrollment did cause an increase in
property tax rates for non-enrolled properties, but in the long-term, municipalities were
able to reduce property tax rates due to an increase in the values of properties
surrounding the protected areas. Tax bills were still higher on these surrounding
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properties, due to their higher value, but the tax rate being levied on the properties was
lower. This study shows that enrollment in the MFL and CF programs can cause property
tax rates to increase, but the long-term effects have not been well studied. For Wisconsin
at least, it may be that on the long-term the effects have lessened, due to an increase in
value of properties surrounding the MFL forests. In Michigan this may not matter as

Acreage

much, due to the capping of the rate of taxable value increase on properties.

Year

Figure 9: Acreage enrolled in Commercial Forest program from 1926-2020 (K. Maidlow 2021,
personal communication, 25 February)
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Number of Applications

Year

Figure 10: Number of applications per year for the Commercial Forest program 1926-2020 (K.
Maidlow 2021, personal communication, 25 February)

Table 11: Change in MFL acres from 1990-2018
Total MFL
Year
% Growth
Acres
1990
372,102
NA
1995
804,269
116.14%
2000
1,971,474
145.13%
2005
2,784,889
41.26%
2010
3,079,985
10.60%
2011
3,133,534
1.74%
2012
3,195,894
1.99%
2013
3,236,030
1.26%
2014
3,271,936
1.11%
2015
3,305,206
1.02%
2016
3,316,955
0.36%
2017
3,344,858
0.84%
2018
3,378,413
1.00%
(Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 2019)
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5 Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to assess the implications of increasing enrollment in
the Commercial Forest and Managed Forest Law forest tax programs on non-enrolled
property tax rates in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and northern Wisconsin. Based on the
hypothetical scenarios in which program enrollment increased 5%, 10%, and 15%, the
enrollment increases required townships to increase property tax rates to maintain
revenues, thereby shifting the tax burden onto the non-enrolled properties. In general, the
magnitude of this increase appears to be rather minimal for the average township,
especially considering that actual increases in enrollment are likely much lower than the
simulated increases that were used for this analysis. Overall, rural, less populated
townships with a small available property tax base appear to be most sensitive to changes
in program enrollment, experiencing higher tax rate increases. Additional revenue from
the state and federal governments through revenue sharing and PILT payments do not
seem to be adequately aiding the townships in helping to mitigate shifts in the tax burden.
In Michigan, the more sensitive townships were seen to receive the lowest amount of
revenue from the revenue sharing program, demonstrating that these payments from the
state are not distributed according to the specific needs of the township. In view of these
results, the forest tax programs and the states may need to consider making policy
changes to better address variability in the effects on townships and to help lessen the
burden of the tax shift on the non-enrolled properties.

5.1 Policy considerations


States reimburse the townships at differing levels, with regards to the sensitivity
of each township

It is evident that state aid to the townships through its reimbursement payments for
enrolled properties and its revenue sharing programs may not be sufficiently aiding the
townships that are most sensitive to changes in program enrollment. To acknowledge this
disparity, the reimbursement payments for the forest tax programs from the state could be
altered such that townships are reimbursed according to their specific needs. Currently
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both states reimburse at a flat rate across all townships, but a possible change could be
considered such that the reimbursement rate is more dependent on the population and size
of the township’s tax base. More sensitive townships with low population and a smaller
tax base could be reimbursed at higher rates than less sensitive townships with a larger
tax base. With this policy change the tax rate levied on enrolled properties may be able to
stay the same, as adjusting the reimbursement payments may be sufficient to lessen
township sensitivity. State reimbursement rates may also need to change on an annual
basis to reflect any changes in enrollment that occur. Similar policy changes should
possibly be considered for the states revenue sharing programs as well, so that more
revenue is being distributed to the townships with lower populations. However, it is
unlikely that this policy will change for Michigan as its part of the state constitution,
which places more importance on the reimbursement payments from the state.


CF and MFL programs increase the tax rate on enrolled properties

It may be necessary for the CF and MFL program administration to consider increasing
the tax rates in general that are levied on enrolled properties. Reduced taxes are a main
incentive for these types of programs, but it may be that the current tax rates are set too
low. Higher tax rates that are still lower than what the normal taxpayer is levied may help
to lessen the burden of the tax shift. In fact, a recent news report indicated that
Michigan’s 38th District State Senator, Ed McBroom, is working to try and raise the CF
program’s tax rate on the enrolled properties and to have conservancies pay higher taxes
on the properties that are locked in preservation (Drue, 2021). For the MFL program in
particular, it may be beneficial to consider increasing the tax rates levied on enrolled
properties, especially the open MFL properties that were enrolled prior to 2005, as it was
this enrollment category that most influenced Wisconsin township sensitivity. However,
since properties that enroll in the MFL program sign up with either a 25- or 50-year
contract, it may not be possible for the program to change its policy and increase the tax
rates levied on those properties.


Incorporate a variable tax rate on enrolled properties
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Another consideration is for the tax rate levied on enrolled properties to be based on the
average property’s taxable value for that particular township, or on the actual property’s
taxable value rather than having a flat rate tax applied across the state. This would be
more tailored to the individual township, better accounting for the differences in
sensitivity across the townships. However, this would add complexity to the programs,
and may be a deterrent to landowners enrolling in the program. These programs provide
many benefits, such as its preservation of forested land, and as much as they can cause a
negative implication to the property tax revenues in a township, it is also desired for
enrollment to increase.


Incorporate different tax rates for corporate/industrial landowners and family
forest owners

Another consideration for the forest tax programs is to incorporate different tax rates for
different types of landowners, possibly having higher tax rates on corporate/industrial
lands than for family forest landowners. Only about 902 acres of family forests in
Michigan and 3,543 acres of family forests in Wisconsin are currently enrolled in a
property tax program (Butler et al. 2020). Considering how about 2.2 million acres are
currently enrolled in the Commercial Forest program (Michigan Department of Natural
Resources, 2020), and 3.4 million acres are enrolled in the Managed Forest Law program
(Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, 2020c), it can be assumed that most
private forestland enrolled in these programs are owned by industrial or corporate
landowners. It may help to lessen the township sensitivity if these lands were taxed at a
higher rate. By only increasing the tax rate on industrial/corporate properties it would
allow it to stay at its current reduced rate for enrolled properties owned by family forest
owners, and would continue to act as an incentive to encourage family forest owners to
enroll in the programs.


Including a closed option for properties enrolled in CF program

It is also worth considering whether the CF program should offer an option for the
landowners to keep their land closed to the public, at the expense of a higher tax rate than
if they were to keep it open to the public. For the MFL program, a higher proportion of
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closed properties helped to lessen the townships’ sensitivity, due to the higher amount of
taxes that were being paid from those properties. The most sensitive townships were the
ones with a higher proportion of properties that were kept open to the public, particularly
if they were enrolled before 2005 and paying the more reduced tax rate. Offering a closed
option for the CF program may similarly help to lessen township sensitivity in the Upper
Peninsula and help to mitigate the shift in the tax burden felt by the non-enrolled
properties. However, offering such an option may also lead to an increase in program
enrollment, particularly by family forest owners who may want to keep their properties
closed to public recreational access. While it may be desired to promote further
enrollment, a sudden increase in enrollment may also have more negative implications
than positive, resulting in a greater shift in the tax burden despite the positive effects from
the higher tax fees on closed lands. While theoretically there is a closed option for
landowners to be found in the Qualified Forest Program, future research is needed to
determine the difference in tax rates between this program and the Commercial Forest
program, and to determine whether offering a closed option for the Commercial Forest
program is worth considering.
In conclusion, forest tax programs at simulated levels of increased enrollment can have
negative effects on rural township property tax rates, and these effects differ among
townships. Rural townships that have a high percentage of land enrolled in forest tax
programs are most sensitive to increased enrollment, resulting in greater increases in tax
rates for non-enrolled property. However, the shifting tax burden associated with forest
tax programs is only one side to the issue. This study only focused on the costs of these
programs to local municipalities. It is important to also consider the benefits of these
programs, through active forest management, preservation of large tracts of forested land,
and public access. Future research is needed to study the economic benefits that these
programs provide, to whom the benefits accrue, and to study if the benefits outweigh the
costs of these programs.
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A

Houghton County Timber Cutover Assessment
The assumed taxable values of forested property that were used for the

hypothetical scenarios for Michigan were derived from actual taxable values of forested
properties 40 acres or greater and classified as timber cutover land in Houghton County.
The average taxable value was $199 per acre, with a range between $21 and $1,225
taxable value per acre (Table A1).

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Timber Cutover Land 40+ acres in Houghton County
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

N

Taxable Value
($ per acre)

199

176.71

21

1,225

536

Acres

75

50.11

40

480

536
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